Abstract-In this paper, we propose multi-population replicator dynamics with changes of players' interpretations. We consider that each population has various interpretation functions and choose one of them depending on payoffs. We propose a model representing changes of the interpretation functions according to the payoffs. Moreover, we apply our proposed model to a well-known example of a hypergame "Soccer Hooliganism" and show that the interpretation changes depending on the evolutions of distributions of strategies.
Introduction
The game theory has made considerable achievements in many scientific fields including economics, politics, and social science. Its extensions have been investigated in several different directions. Among them, we focus on an evolutionary game and a hypergame [1, 2] .
In evolutionary game theory, the distribution of strategies in the population is changed according to payoffs which players earn depending on their selected strategies [3] . In this process, a strategy is called an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) if, whenever all members of the population adopt it, no dissident strategy could invade the population [4] . On the other hands, a dynamic characteristics of the selection process is described by replicator dynamics [5, 6, 7] . Replicator dynamics describes evolutions of the distribution of strategies in the population itself. Though no players' rationalities are assumed in evolutionary games, an ESS and an equilibrium point of replicator dynamics are closely involved with equilibrium concepts of noncooperative game theory [8] .
On the other hand, in many conflict situations, players' perceptions are different each other and their behaviors depend on their perceptions to the game. Such a situation is modeled by a hypergame [2, 9, 10] . Various solution concepts and methods of analysis taking players' perceptions into account have been proposed for the hypergames [11] . The hypergame theory investigates the effects of players' perceptions about strategies and payoffs on their decisions.
Replicator dynamics describes evolutions of the distribution of strategies in the populations according to payoffs which players earn depending on their selected strategies. Although replicator dynamics is a model of players that select a strategy by trial and error, the influence of players' perceptions has to be taken into consideration. Recently, to discuss such a situation, replicator dynamics for multipopulation hypergames has been proposed in [12] . A rigorous definition of player's perception is given by an interpretation function which specifies the relationship between strategies of a player and those of the other players. Replicator dynamics for hypergames is a model introducing the interpretation function into multi-population evolutionary games. In n-population models where each population has different perception, both an ESS and replicator dynamics are formulated [12] . However, it is assumed that players' perceptions are given and fixed. Each player's perception may change according to strategies used by the other players and results of games.
In this paper, we propose multi-population replicator dynamics with changes of players' interpretations. We consider that each population has various interpretation functions and choose one of them depending on payoffs. We propose a model representing changes of the interpretation functions. Soccer Hooliganism [10] is a well-known example of a hypergame, and its replicator dynamics has been derived in [12] . We apply our proposed model to the example and show that the interpretation changes depending on the distributions of strategies.
Replicator Dynamics for Hypergames
A common perception in a population may not always acceptable in other populations. For example, if some differences of perceptions arise between populations, then strategies which are regarded as the same strategy in a population may be perceived distinguishably in the other populations. In order to discuss such situations, replicator dynamics for multi-population hypergames has been proposed [12] .
Suppose that there exist n large populations P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P n . For each population P i (i ∈ N = {1, · · · , n}), let Φ i = {1, 2, . . . , m i } be a set of pure strategies of P i , and S i be a set of population states of P i , where a population state is a distribution of strategies in a population of players with a pure strategy. In our proposed model, the players' interpretations of the set of pure strategies and population states can be different from one another. Let Bruges, Belgium, October 18-21, 2005
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2005 International Symposium on Nonlinear Φ i j and S i j be P i 's sets of pure strategies and population states perceived by P j , respectively. The first subscript i stands for a population to which the strategy (or the population state) belongs, while the second one j stands for a population which perceives the strategy. Denoted by
is the proportion of players with a pure strategy k ∈ Φ i in P i . We define sets of population state combinations S and S −i by Cartesian product S = × i∈N S i and S −i = × j∈(N−i) S j , respectively, where (N − i) = { j ∈ N| j i}. For s ∈ S, denoted by s −i ∈ S −i is the population state combination which results from s by removing s i ∈ S i : i.e.,
The mapping F i j : Φ i → Φ i j is called P j 's interpretation function to P i . Depending on the interpretation function F i j of pure strategies, an interpretation function f i j : S i → S i j of population states is defined as follows: for each population state
where f k i j is the kth element of f i j and f ii is the identity map-
In each population, suppose that the rate of increase of players with a strategy k is expressed as the difference between the payoffs of a player with a strategy k and the average payoff of the population. Replicator dynamics for hypergames which describes the changes of the population states in each population is given bẏ
for all i ∈ N and k ∈ Φ i , where e k i is the m i -dimensional unit vector such that the kth element equals 1.
Changes of Interpretations
The model of Section 2 is an evolutionary game model considering players' perceptions [12] . However, it is assumed that the introduced interpretation functions are given and fixed. In this section, we propose a model with changes of the interpretation functions.
We consider that each population has various interpretation functions and changes its interpretations depending on 
Note that P i must change its interpretation functions if the condition (3) holds. For a population state combination s and an interpretation combination f , if there exist i (i ∈ N), k, and k (k, k = 1, · · · , m f i ) satisfying the condition (3), s is said to be infeasible for f , otherwise feasible for f . According to the above definition, interpretation functions of each population change discretely, and evolutions of population states depend on replicator dynamics (2) . Obviously, such a system is a hybrid system.
Soccer Hooliganism
Soccer Hooliganism [10] , which is a noncooperative game between fans and authorities, is a well-known example of a hypergame and its replicator dynamics has been derived in [12] . In this section, we introduce changes of interpretations into the replicator dynamics.
In the game perceived by fans, which will be called "fans' game", the fans have three strategies, "Orderly behavior (Beh.)", "Play hooligan (P.H.)", and "Real hooliganism (R.H.)". Authorities have two strategies, "Tough response (Tou.)" and "Tolerant response (Tol.)". On the other hand, in the game perceived by the authorities, which will be called "authorities' game", the fans have two strategies, "Acceptable (Acc.)" and "Unacceptable (Unacc.)", and the authorities have two strategies, "Intervention (Int.)" and "Non-Intervention (Non-Int.)".
In fans' game, population states are described as follows:
• Fans' population state s 1 = [s In authorities' game, population states are described as follows:
• Fans' population state s 12 = [s 1 12 , s 2 
]
T : s We consider two types of interpretation function combinations. In both cases, suppose that fans perceive "Int." and "Non-Int." as "Tou." and "Tol.", respectively. Hence, f 1 (s) = (s 1 , s 2 ). Moreover, in the type 1, suppose that authorities perceive both "Beh." and "P.H." as "Acc.", and (2), replicator dynamics of P 1 's strategies are formulated as follows:
For each interpretation function of P 2 , dynamics of P 2 's strategies are given bẏ (3), we consider the following differences: Figure 1 shows the contours of Eqs. (7) and (8) . Since Eq. (7) is negative for all s (4), (5), (6) , and P 2 's interpretation
Simulation II Next, we change authorities' payoffs of Soccer Hooliganism as shown in Table 2 . In this case, authorities prefer the pair of "Acc." and "Int" to that of "Unacc." and "Int". Similar to Simulation I, replicator dynamics of P 1 's strategies are formulated as Eqs. (4) and (5) in this situation. However, dynamics of P 2 's strategies in this situation are different from that in Simulation I and given bẏ (4), (5), (9) , and P 2 's interpretation From condition (3), we consider the following differences: Figure 3 shows the contours of Eqs. (10) and (11) . In this situation, Eq. (10) 
Conclusions
In this paper, we have proposed replicator dynamics of hypergames with changes of players' interpretations. We consider that each population has various interpretation functions and changes them depending on payoffs. Moreover, we have applied our proposed model to a well-known example of a hypergame "Soccer Hooliganism", and we have shown that the interpretation changes depending on the evolutions of distributions of strategies. It is future work to discuss stabilities of interpretation functions and population states using stability theory of a hybrid system.
